

R&SB

This Notice Expires 1 November 1980

COMMUNICATIONS

5 October 1979

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USE OF PSEUDONYMS AND CRYPTONYMS
IN CABLES AND TELEPOUCHES (C)

Field Counterpart: [] dated 5 October 1979

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1. This notice presents guidelines for the use of pseudonyms, cryptonyms, and other identity substitutes in electronic communications and emphasizes the need for responsible application of these standards. Provisions concerning cables also apply to telepouches. (C)

2. Electrical transmission of encrypted messages is secure. However, security considerations require use of pseudonyms, cryptonyms, or other identity substitutes in certain circumstances because there are risks of compromise through exposure of copies of cables before or after transmission. The following guidelines are intended to promote a balance between the need for rapid comprehension of cabled information and requirements for protection of sensitive information. (C)

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3. True names should be used in cables and telepouches whenever consistent with the security of the person, activity, or thing referred to. Such usage would normally include the following:

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b. For U.S. Government officials and entities of the U.S. Government in correspondence concerning their performance of overt functions.

c. In Agency cables that transmit information identical to that sent to field installations in "unsanitized" form by other U.S. Government agencies.

d. In cables that concern readily discernible overt matters and quotations from the media.

e. For references to countries or other entities when an identity substitute is not necessary to protect sources or methods. (C)

4. Identity substitutes will normally be used in the following circumstances:

a. Pseudonyms and cryptonyms should be used in operational and other sensitive traffic when it is necessary to protect sources and methods information. []

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5. Routing indicators used to facilitate headquarters distribution or correspondence should not be used as cryptonyms. (C)

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Improper use of identity substitutes or unwarranted confidence in their utility can be detrimental to sound security practices and an impediment to rapid and

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lucid communication. Originators of correspondence should consider if the use of an identity substitute in a specific instance will contribute to the security of that correspondence and act accordingly. (C)

DON I. WORTMAN
Deputy Director
for
Administration

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